The Philosophy and Faith of Scientism
by
Rob Lewis
17*****
Submitted to Dr. Mihretu P. Guta
Philosophy and Theology of Science
BIOLA University-Apologetics/Science and Religion Program
Date
12-1-18
Abstract
Scientism is a unique framework of epistemological justification where only those beliefs that are rational and warranted are those that are produced by science. The commitment to scientism includes philosophical and theological assumptions. This paper will attempt to show that strong scientism is not only irrational, but that science in general is burdened with philosophical assumptions and faith-like commitments that are not unlike commitments found in theology.
I. Scientism & Theology
Science has played a major role in society, and over the past two hundred years has proven to be an incredibly useful tool in the advancement of our civilization as a whole, most obviously through technology and medicine. This recognized success has led some to conclude that science is the only legitimate means of gaining knowledge, called strong scientism, and others have concluded that while science is not the only legitimate means of gaining knowledge, it is superior to other forms, such as philosophy and theology. This less dogmatic view is referred to as weak scientism. Without question there is a western cultural commitment to scientific knowledge that holds science and its scientists in high regard in a way that seems to point to the fact that science has gained a new kind of authority and final say not unlike the prophetic and sacred religious writings once enjoyed in times past.
While scientism may be rejected as a serious philosophical position, it can readily be observed in culture and held perhaps unconsciously as science continues to be held in highest esteem in the public square. On the other hand, theology has been, as of late, confined to the world of values rather than included in the world of fact and objective reality. Lawrence M. Principe makes an important observation along this line of thought. Dr. Principe has two earned doctorates, a Ph.D. in chemistry, and a Ph.D. in the history of science. As well, he is the Drew Professor of the Humanities at Johns Hopkins University in the Department of History of Science and Technology and the Department of Chemistry. He states the following in his essay Scientism and the Religion of Science:
“Yet another development has been on the rise of the celebrity scientist. Such figures have authored best-selling books not so much to explain scientific ideas and discoveries, but rather to make expansive, sometimes shockingly bold, statements about larger epistemological and ontological issues and to declaim about the role of science, scientific methodology, and the scientist in human society and civilization generally…leaving the confines of their narrow fields of expertise to preach a political, philosophical, and religious agenda that cannot be supported by either their expertise or the methods they claim that science follows.[1]
Dr. Principe is referring to the likes of Richard Dawkins who is perhaps the best known celebrity scientist today, who once also held the Charles Simonyi Chair for the Public Understanding of Science at the University of Oxford. He has authored best-selling books that are not meant to explain a scientific discovery, but like his book The God Delusion, are aimed at making philosophical statements about the nature of belief in God. The point is that culturally there is strong evidence that science has received the highest authority and honor, and other branches of knowledge have been deemed less valuable and less objective. This is consistent with the existentialist movement to detach scientific research from the subjective and personal character of theological inquiry.[2] It is understood that science is objective, rational and concrete, while theology is subjective, irrational and abstract. This distinction is at the heart of scientism.
Philosopher of science, Tom Sorell defines scientism as “the belief that science, especially natural science, is much the most valuable part of human learning—much the most valuable part because it is much the most authoritative, or serious, or beneficial.”[3] Sorell goes on to add, “Other beliefs related to this one may also be regarded as scientistic, e.g. the belief that science is the only valuable part of human learning, or the view that it is always good for subjects that do not belong to science to be placed on a scientific footing.”[4] Other subjects would include theology, which, as noted above, has been categorized as subjective, and dependent upon unobservable and or untestable propositions, and therefore is of a lower class of rational justification.
This aim of this paper is to show that strong scientism is not only irrational but that even weak scientism is burdened with philosophical assumptions and faith-like commitments that are not unlike commitments found in theology. If faith is seen as irrational it must be in light of some stated criteria. The task then will be to uncover these criteria and apply them to science as well. The hypothesis is that when the criteria is considered, science will also require faith-like commitments of the same sort that have been used against theology to show that religious faith is irrational (faith here meaning trust or commitment without absolute certainty, empirical justification, or full understanding). The argument is that both science and theology have room for faith seeking understanding, both serving as rational justification for belief formation.
II. Science & Epistemology
To begin, it is worth attempting to address the question of science’s purpose and ability to provide justification for rational belief. Can science provide an absolute explanation for the way the world actually works? For the scientific realist, science’s purpose or aim is to provide truth-based explanations of how the physical world actually works. Some realists argue that even though past theories have undergone significant changes, some being overthrown as a result of scientific revolutions, our most successful and best theories today are not at risk of being overthrown like the less successful theories of the past. As Fahrbach Ludwig notes,
They are supported by extremely good evidence, practically all of which has been gathered in the last few decades (typically long after the theories were originally accepted). By contrast, practically all refuted theories, both of earlier and more recent times, were only supported by moderately good evidence at best…our current best theories have experienced big boosts to their empirical success in the last few decades…and are therefore almost certainly safe from scientific revolutions.[5]
The idea is that we can have confidence in the fact that our most successful theories are those that are least likely to be overthrown by revolutions, and therefore are good examples of science actually pointing to reality. This understanding of science is at the heart of scientism, since the belief is that science actually describes reality better than any other branch of human knowledge. For the antirealist, science is simply providing useful theories that may or may not actually point to truth, while the modest scientific realist argues that science does aim at truth, yet not all theories warrant the same level of confidence. A certain openness is in order so as to allow for theories to be improved upon or even replaced without concluding that absolute truth is required before belief.
Quickly it becomes obvious that there are many different opinions in the philosophy of science regarding the role and limits of science in human knowledge and belief justification. For the sake of argument, this paper will assume the modest realist position and work from that understanding in order to demonstrate that while science is at least in some degree aiming at and capable of providing truth, it fails to provide absolute certainty without any faith-like commitments. It is important then to review the way science is thought to be a reliable source of knowledge and examine whether or not there is any evidence of faith in science-based epistemology.
III. Criteria & Justification
The question that must be addressed right off is the question of criteria. What is it about science that makes it a reliable form of justification for beliefs? Most understand that in science, truth is found in evidence, mainly that which is observable. This kind of evidence is empirical evidence, which is open to experience through the senses. Therefore, most believe that science aims at producing empirical evidence, the kind that satisfies the criteria of the empiricists, who argue that scientific evidence is to be experienced. Kia Nielson notes, “…to be an empiricist-any kind of empiricist at all-is, at a minimum, to believe that all of our knowledge and understanding of matters of fact-of what is the case-is and must be, at least in the ultimate sort, based upon or derived from experience.”[6] According to the empiricist, reality is known ultimately through experience. This empirical framework is how most see scientific knowledge working to provide justification for holding any belief to be true. If one is justified epistemologically in most cases when they hold a belief based on empirical evidence, then why not make empirical evidence a requirement for justified true belief in all cases? It seems that this is the case, and this very criterion is what could be used to argue against the rationality of theology, revelation and religious faith.
At first take, the requirement of empirical evidence seems to be reasonable when the conversation is restricted to scientific knowledge. Scientism claims that scientific knowledge is of the highest value, and this knowledge is thought to be the kind that is acquired through observation and experimentation. However, the question being considered is whether or not all legitimate human knowledge can be reduced to the kind of knowledge that is supported by empirical evidence, which is what would be required in order to say that scientism is even possibly true. But even if we restrict the scope to scientific knowledge, is it reasonable to require that sufficient evidence be the kind that is empirically verifiable? It seems here we run into a problem. For we know that even in science some of the most widely held beliefs cannot be confirmed through direct observation, such as the strong and weak nuclear forces, gravity, and mathematical theorems, yet no one seriously doubts their existence. This point is drawn out by the philosopher J.P. Moreland, “For one thing, scientific theories often deal with unobservable entities and processes such as quarks and electromagnetic fields.”[7] These are the kinds of things that are well established in science, yet are not directly observable.
Are we to conclude that unless a belief is based on empirical evidence we are not justified in holding it as true? If it lacks empirical evidence, is it then not only unjustifiable, but unscientific? It seems that this requirement is even too great for science. In this line of thought Alex Rosenberg notes that, “Scientific explanations are supposed to be testable, they have ‘empirical content,’ their component laws describe the way things are in the world and have implications for our experience. But almost from the outset science has explained by appeal to a realm of unobservable, undetectable, theoretical entities, processes, things events, and properties.”[8] Given the fact that science appeals to and accepts as true many things beyond direct observation, the question then follows: is it rational then to reduce scientific knowledge to that which can be experienced empirically? There remains a strong sense that this is exactly what science is. As the evidentialist would argue in a similar way as the empiricist, seeing is believing. This idea goes back to a time before the enlightenment, yet is no less present today. An example of the evidentialist concept of science can be traced back to St. Thomas Aquinas. St. Aquinas is quoted by Alvin Plantinga who notes that according to Aquinas, scientia is inferred from what is seen to be true, “Any science is possessed by virtue of principles known immediately and therefore seen. Whatever, then, is an object of science is in some sense seen.”[9] So it is the case that it is not simply a matter of what one believes, but also how one comes to believe, and the criteria set. If only scientific knowledge is legitimate knowledge, and scientific knowledge is empirical knowledge, then what is one to do considering the non-empirical knowledge crucial and well established in science, like electromagnetic fields, and electrons? This is interesting considering the fact that, as already noted, much of science is not available to direct observation and experience. The point is made that believing the right things are not enough, you are only justified in believing if you have observation as the foundational justification. This is the “how”, not simply the “what” in belief forming. Building upon this brief survey of science and epistemology, it is fitting to turn now to scientism and its underlying philosophical assumptions.
IV. Philosophical Assumptions of Scientism
The role of science is to provide true explanations for how the world actually works. The claim is that science is uniquely qualified in accomplishing this goal because it is concerned with how one comes to a belief. The basic rules or criteria are set, justified belief is that which is scientific, meaning it is empirically verifiable, and observable. The criteria have been established so far to include outlining the way in which one believes. This is the first philosophical assumption of scientism, and in science in general. As soon as the conversation turns to meaning and ought and belief formation or epistemology, the discipline of philosophy has been invoked and hard science is no longer leading the way.
The second example of philosophy being assumed in science is basic logic and natural order. The law of coherence, the law of non-contradiction and the law of identity are assumed foundations in scientific investigation along with an assumption that things are generally orderly in nature. Without the basic rules of logic, which are beyond the authority of science, science has no meaning at all. In this way the scientist assumes a philosophy concerning reality that is not open to scientific investigation, and it does so out of necessity. To be fair, some have rejected philosophy as being capable of studying reality, since it does not deal with physical reality, and those who would make such a claim are physicalists who believe that nothing exists outside of physical reality. However, it seems that even the physicalist is practicing philosophy in making distinctions between their physicalist world view and the world view that philosophy is a worthy investigation into non-physical reality. The concept and or idea of physicalism is not itself physical, and matter is not the subject at hand in the distinction between this worldview and any other. Once again it is clear that philosophy is at work. But to push the idea further in showing that there is an underlying philosophy to science, it is worth quoting scientist-theologian Alister McGrath, “Science is concerned with the uncovering and representation of the forms and patterns that occur in the natural world…But how do we know that nature possess regularity? How do we know that there are uniform structures and patterns throughout the totality of natural order? Is this a conclusion of scientific research-or is it an essential assumption underlying this research?”[10] McGrath is highlighting this very case that science assumes knowledge about nature that guides empirical inquiry. McGrath goes on to quote Norwood R. Hanson in saying, “To gain knowledge of these principles by experiment and observation is to presuppose in the search the very existence of that which we are in search. If the principles are true, we cannot learn of it empirically, for the essence of the principle is that there is presupposed in every empirical inquiry.”[11] The orderliness of nature and the ability to logically discern it is a philosophical assumption science depends upon.
Another example of a philosophical assumption in science is found in causation theory. Science is often aimed at solving questions regarding causation. Take for instance an early scientific inquiry such as understanding how the heavens moved, which then led the Babylonian astronomers to pioneer mathematical astronomy to document and predict particular patterns. This investigation into causation is what drove later scientists such as Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo to give the scientific revolution the start it needed in the proposing and clarifying of the Heliocentric model, which overthrew the ancient geocentric model held since long before the birth of Christ. On a large scale, astronomy aims at understanding causation, namely in what causes the stars and planets to appear as they do, but an underlying chain of events awaits the investigator who wishes to truly uncover the necessary cause that is actually responsible for the effect observed. Often what is considered the cause is not actually the primary cause, or even the kind of cause that can be isolated from other sufficient causes. As in the example of astronomy, there is planetary motion which is affected by mass, velocity, and gravitational attraction, which means knowing how the planets move is a much less involved study than knowing why they move in such a manner.
This is referred to as an INUS condition outlined by the philosopher J. L. Mackie, where a cause is insufficient, but necessary in a bundle of factors that were unnecessary but sufficient.[12] There potentially could be a nearly infinite regress into the causal chain to explain a particular event or phenomena. But most scientific explanations are content with stopping the investigation and explanation much earlier, assuming sufficient and necessary causation. This is where the debate over under-determinism in causation would come into play philosophically, but sufficient determinism in causation is assumed in science. This is actually consistent with the idea that science is not concerned with proof, but is rather concerned with coherence. As Owen Gingerich has been quoted, “…science as we have come to use it relies very little on proof. Science is primarily looking for a self-consistent description of nature that hangs together in a convincing way…Science works by coherence, not by proof.”[13] As is the case in epistemology, science must rest on assumptions at some point in the face of the collapse of foundationalism and the inability to perfectly isolate properly basic beliefs and necessary and sufficient causes. Absolute proof is out of reach, and coherence must satisfy the scientific investigator in explaining causation.
Perhaps the most obvious and relevant philosophical assumption in science is in the stated hope of finding a unified scientific theory of everything. This hope is expressed by the philosopher Thomas Cook when he states, “In this sense it is urged that the characteristics of scientific development is the growth of larger and larger systems, covering more and more facts under single laws. This may perhaps be taken to imply that when and if science itself became perfect, all knowledge would be consequent of one great law, and that idea is successful as a pragmatic approach.”[14] There is a philosophical assumption in believing that perhaps one day all knowledge will be unified in one great law, and that assumption is that all knowledge can be reduced to a scientific law, but that very assumption cannot be proven through empirical observation.
This then leads one to consider the dogmatic claim of scientism, that only beliefs that are empirically tested and verified are true and rational. As Moreland has pointed out, this claim is not a claim of science, rather it is a philosophical claim, and as such is self-refuting.[15] It is self-refuting because it makes a truth claim that if true, renders itself false. To claim that other forms of knowledge and beliefs are irrational is a philosophical claim, not a scientific claim that can be empirically tested, observed or falsified. What one then is left with is the fact that scientism rests upon a nonscientific self-refuting truth claim. This means that scientism is philosophical rather than based upon scientific justification and logically proves to also be irrational. This is not to say that scientism is irrational because it is a philosophical claim as if only scientific claims are rational, but it is irrational because it is a philosophical claim that discredits philosophical claims.
V. Similarities of Science & Theology
As Wolfhart Pannenberg notes, “Knowledge must always begin with the universal and abstract and only at the end reach the concrete which all the previous, abstract approaches were ultimately directed.”[16] In both science and theology general truths are established first, and then upon the foundational ideas and concepts more specific and complex ideas are added. Likewise, it has been argued, in varying degrees of success, that there is no fundamental difference between the mathematician, the physicists and the theologian in that they all rest on basic axioms which cannot be proven, yet support all subsequent reasoning.[17] There is a point in which some truths are accepted in good faith and reason without invoking an infinite regress of justification. Some truths are known in context, and that context is important. As the scientist theologian John Polkinghorne rightly points out, there is no universal epistemology, “There is not one single, simple way in which we can know everything; there is no universal epistemology. We know the everyday world in one way, in its Newtonian clarity; we know the quantum world in another way, in its Heisenbergian uncertainty. Our knowledge of entities must be allowed to conform to the way in which they actually can be known.”[18] In both science and theology there is a certain mystery that remains out of reach, which requires a certain amount of faith that while we don’t know exactly how everything works, there is an underlying order, even if the order is full of antinomies.
In science, namely in physics, there are many examples of where a universal and simple epistemology won’t work. For example, we know that light is both a particle and a wave, which is paradoxical, yet not contradictory. There are matrix mechanics, wave mechanics, and the measurement problem of quantum theory, which is itself a paradox in light of the general theory of relativity.[19] As well, there is the problem of material particles and spectral gaps being measured differently even when just one atom is added to material that contains 10^23 atoms, while at the same time there is no way of calculating when the spectral gap might occur relative to a change in material size.[20] It is overwhelmingly clear that in science, epistemic humility is in order, and this humility looks a lot like faith seeking understanding.
In theology the same can be said to be true: there is faith seeking understanding. Seeking to understand reality includes seeking to understand the unobservable, immaterial necessary first cause. This can be done in two ways, investigation and revelation. The Creator can be known through that which has been created, and the Creator can be known through revelation and experience. This is the sense in which belief in God is rational if it is formed and sustained by good inference, or immediate belief through experience or revelation, and as Nicholas Wolterstorff states, “I see no reason to suppose that holding the belief that God exists as one of one’s immediate beliefs always represents some failure on one’s part to govern one’s assent as well as one ought.”[21] This, however, does not mean that religious beliefs can never be revised and/or corrected. Not unlike the case of scientific revolutions, theological understanding can be improved upon and progress in truth seeking can be made. Wolterstorff observes that even developments in science can impact religious commitment, “Christians have been mistaken in what they thought constituted authentic Christian following; and sometimes they have become aware of their mistake through developments in science.”[22] This simply means that in theology, like in science, there is a greater truth to aim at, and each investigator can commit and hold to beliefs of varying degrees of accuracy and explanation. The Christian scholar is not unlike the scientist in that the subject corrects and guides the scholar into deeper and more comprehensive understanding. No theologian claims to fully understand God, while at the same time he understands that there is a systematic framework that guides his schema development, which can be improved upon thorough testing and weighing faith like commitments, and making corrections as irrational and incorrect beliefs are identified. So too the scientist holds to a reasonably reliable systematic framework with the expectation of gaining a fuller picture over time, which includes abandoning false ideas and failed theories.
In another line of thought, there are some things to which science cannot provide answers that theology can, such as the origin of the universe, the origin of the fundamental laws of nature, the fine tuning of the universe, the origin of consciousness, and the existence of moral, rational and aesthetic objective laws.[23] In this way it is clear that as in some ways within science there is a need for a modular epistemology, as Newtonian and quantum physics require different frames of understanding, so too in the case of science and theology there is a need for a different frame of understanding in certain contexts. Some knowledge cannot be gained through empirical means, some knowledge rests upon revelation, the testimony of reliable sources and degrees of certainty. Even when considering the weakness of inference to the best explanation, it seems that at times we are left with such inferences when it comes to things like the origin of stars or the nature of the earth’s core.[24]
VI. Conclusion
Scientism claims that only knowledge gained through the empirical scientific method is reliable, rational and valuable. It has been shown that this claim is self-refuting, and as it turns out, there are many philosophical assumptions foundational to science, and even in science, there are many things held that cannot be empirically verified. The point is that theology and science have a lot in common in that they both employ commitments beyond absolute empirical justification. At the same time both seek understanding employing systems that guide investigation aimed at producing true beliefs. In both fields, there is no single epistemology, and in both systems evidence is sought, theories are weighed and beliefs and commitments are clarified, and reformed and refined. And in both fields a certain measure of humility is in order as both fields present paradoxical truths that drive both the scientist and theologian to epistemic humility that looks a lot like faith. As the physicist Paul Davies rightly notes, even if science were to explain the world, we still need to explain science, and if physics is the product of design, it must have a purpose, and modern physics strongly suggests that purpose includes us.[25]
Works Cited
Cook, Thomas. "Science: Natural and Social." Philosophy of Science (The University of Chicago Press) 6, no. 3 (1939): 318-327.
Cubitt, Toby S., David Perez-Garcia, and Michael Wolf. "The Unsolvable Problem ." Scientific American, 10 2018: 28-37.
Davies, Paul. Superforce: The Search for a Grand Unified Theory of Nature. New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1985.
Fahrbach, Ludwig. "Scientific revolutions and the explosion of scientific evidence." Synthese 194, no. 12 (2017): 5039-5072.
Gingerich, Owen. "How Galileo Changed the Rules of Science." Sky and Telescope 85. 3 1993.
Ladyman, James. Understanding Philosophy of Science. New York: Routledge, 2002.
Loux, Michael J. Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction . New York: Routledge, 2006.
McGrath, Alister. Intellectuals Don't Need God & Other Modern Myths. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1993.
Moreland, J.P. Christianity and the Nature of Science . Grand Rapids: Baker Academic , 1989.
—. Scientism and Secularism . Wheaton: Crossway, 2018.
Nielsen, Kai. "Is Empiricism an Ideology?" Metaphilosophy 3, no. 4 (1972): 265-273.
Pannenberg, Wolfhart. "Laying Theological Claim to Scientific Understandings." In Begining With The End: God, Science, and Wolfhart Pannenberg, 51-64. Peru: Open Court Publishing, 1997.
—. Theology and the Philosophy of Science. Philadelphia : The Westminster Press, 1976.
Plantinga, Alvin. "Reason and Belief in God." In Faith and Rationality, 16-93. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983.
Polkinghorne, John. Faith, Science & Understanding. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.
Pond, Jean. "Independence: Mutual Humility in the Relationship Between Science & Christian Theology ." In Science & Christianity: Four Views, 67-104. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2000.
Principe, Lawrence M. "Scientism and the Religion of Science." In Scientism: The New Orthodoxy, 41-61. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016.
Rosenberg, Alex. Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction. 3. New York: Routledge, 2012.
Sorell, Tom. Scientism: Philosophy and the Infatuation With Science. London: Routledge, 1991.
Wolterstorff, Nicholas. "Can Belief in God Be Rational?" In Faith and Rationality, 135-186. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983.
—. Reason within the Bounds of Religion. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1999.
[1] Principe, Lawrence M. "Scientism and the Religion of Science." In Scientism: The New
Orthodoxy, 41-61. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016. 41-42.
[2] Pond, Jean. "Independence: Mutual Humility in the Relationship Between Science & Christian
Theology." In Science & Christianity: Four Views, 67-104. Downers Grove: InterVarsity
Press, 2000. 72.
[3] Sorell, Tom. Scientism: Philosophy and the Infatuation With Science. London: Routledge,
1991. 1.
[4] Ibid. Sorell, Tom. Scientism. 1991. 1.
[5] Fahrbach, Ludwig. "Scientific revolutions and the explosion of scientific evidence." Synthese 194, no. 12 (2017): 5039-5072. 5069.
[6] Nielsen, Kai. "Is Empiricism an Ideology?" Metaphilosophy 3, no. 4 (1972): 265-273. 266.
[7] Moreland, J.P. Christianity and the Nature of Science. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1989.
29.
[8] Rosenberg, Alex. Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction. 3. New York:
Routledge, 2012. 142.
[9] Plantinga, Alvin. "Reason and Belief in God." In Faith and Rationality, 16-93. Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1983. 40.
[10] McGrath, Alister. Intellectuals Don't Need God & Other Modern Myths. Grand Rapids:
Zondervan Publishing House, 1993. 163.
[11] Ibid. McGrath, Alister. 1993. 163.
[12] Loux, Michael J. Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction . New York: Routledge, 2006.
197.
[13] Gingerich, Owen. "How Galileo Changed the Rules of Science." Sky and Telescope 85. 3
1993. 36.
[14] Cook, Thomas. "Science: Natural and Social." Philosophy of Science (The University of Chicago Press) 6, no. 3 (1939): 318-327. 323.
[15] Ibid. Moreland, J.P. Christianity and the Nature of Science. 107.
[16] Pannenberg, Wolfhart. "Laying Theological Claim to Scientific Understandings." In
Beginning With The End: God, Science, and Wolfhart Pannenberg, 51-64. Peru:
Open Court Publishing, 1997. 62.
[17] Pannenberg, Wolfhart. Theology and the Philosophy of Science. Philadelphia : The
Westminster Press, 1976. 45.
[18] Polkinghorne, John. Faith, Science & Understanding. New Haven: Yale University Press,
2000. 7.
[19] Ibid. Polkinghorne, John. Faith, Science & Understanding. 2000. 8-9.
[20] Cubitt, Toby S., David Perez-Garcia, and Michael Wolf. "The Unsolvable Problem ."
Scientific American, 10 2018: 28-37. 37.
[21] Wolterstorff, Nicholas. "Can Belief in God Be Rational?" In Faith and Rationality, 135-186.
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983. 176.
[22] Wolterstorff, Nicholas. Reason within the Bounds of Religion. Grand Rapids: Wm.
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1999. 95.
[23] Moreland, J.P. Scientism and Secularism . Wheaton: Crossway, 2018. 135-155.
[24] Ladyman, James. Understanding Philosophy of Science. New York: Routledge, 2002. 211.
[25] Davies, Paul. Superforce: The Search for a Grand Unified Theory of Nature. New York:
Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1985. 243.
